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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN C. DAVIS and KRISTI A. 
DAVIS, 
Plaintiffs, Appellees, and 
Cross-Appellees 
vs, 
U.S. BANCORP MORTGAGE COMPANY, 
formerly U.S. BANCORP REAL ESTATE 
SERVICES, formerly U.S. THRIFT 
& LOAN; and H. CLYDE DAVIS, 
Defendants, Appellees, and 
Cross-Appellant 
Case No. 940443-CA 
Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE PROPERLY PRESENTED THE EVIDENCE 
IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Appellees contend in Point I of their brief that the 
Plaintiffs failed to submit the evidence relied upon to refute 
the motion for summary judgment at the trial court level 
(Appellee's brief at 15-18). 
As demonstrated hereinafter, all of the facts relied upon by 
the Plaintiffs were a part of the Record at the time the trial 
court rendered its decision in this case. All of the facts, as 
set out in the Statement of Facts in Appellants' brief are 
referenced to specific entries in the Record in this case. 
Although an Appellant is precluded from raising new evidence 
on appeal, the Appellant is certainly free to argue all of the 
evidence in the Record at the time the motion for summary 
judgment was decided by the trial court judge. As noted by the 
Court in Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P. 2d 943 n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), the appellate court has an obligation and responsibility 
to "review a trial court's grant of summary judgment using only 
the information on file at the time the trial court granted the 
motion." 
The Court in Ron Shepherd Insurance v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 
(Utah 1994), clearly identified the process in reviewing a motion 
for summary judgment as follows: 
Summary judgment allows the parties to pierce the 
pleadings to determine whether a material issue of 
facts exists that must be resolved by the fact 
finder [citing cases]. In accordance with this 
rule, "the party moving for summary judgment must 
establish a right to judgment based on the applicable 
law as applied to an undisputed material issue of 
fact. A party opposing a motion is required only 
to show that there is a material issue of fact. 
[Emphasis in the original] [citing c a s e s ] . . . . 
accordingly, because this is an appeal from a 
summary judgment, we review the factual submissions 
to the trial court in a light most favorable to 
finding a material issue of fact, [citing cases]. 
"A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis 
of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could 
differ on any material issue [citing cases]. 
Id. See also Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). 
The Appellee fails to cite one factual issue asserted on 
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appeal that was not included in the Record at the time Judge 
Burningham heard arguments on the motion for summary judgment. 
As demonstrated hereinafter, all of the facts asserted by the 
Appellants were contained in the pleadings, affidavits and 
depositions relied upon by the parties at the trial level. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF ANTICIPATORY 
BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
A. The Elements of Anticipatory Breach of Contract. 
In the Appellants' original brief, the law relating to 
anticipatory breach is recited. An anticipatory breach occurs 
when a party to an executory contract manifests a positive and 
unequivocal intent not to render performance when the time fixed 
for performance is due. Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 
86 (Utah 1992); Hurwitz v. David K. Richards, Co., 20 Utah *2d 
232, 234-235, 436 P.2d 794, 796 (1968). 
Utah case law establishes that the other party can 
immediately treat the anticipatory repudiation as a breach, or it 
can continue to treat the contract as operable and urge 
performance without waiving any right to sue for that 
repudiation. Kasco Services Corp, supra, United California Bank 
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 681 P.2d 390, 433 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1983); See also, University Club v. Invesco Holding Corp., 
504 P. 2d 29, 39 (Utah 1972). As noted by the Court in Breuer-
Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 725 (Utah Ct. App. 1990): 
A party that has received a definite repudiation from 
the breaching party to the contract should not be 
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penalized for its efforts to encourage the breaching 
party to perform its end of the bargain. 
The Appellees do not challenge the Appellants' statement of 
the law relating to the elements of anticipatory breach or the 
rights that an anticipatory breach creates in the non-breaching 
party (Appellees' brief at 23). 
B. There are Disputed Issues of Material Fact Relating to 
the Anticipatory Breach of Contract by the Defendant. 
Appellees totally misconstrue the importance of the 
existence of anticipatory breach in this case. The Appellees 
simply argue that: 
Anticipatory breach is not a cause of action but 
rather is a legal ground for the non-breaching party 
to make an election . . . a separate claim for an 
anticipatory breach is meaningless. 
Appellees' brief at 23. 
The importance of the anticipatory breach cause of action is 
that a finding by the fact finder that Defendants breached the 
agreement would have exempted the Plaintiffs from making any 
further payments under the agreement and would have precluded the 
Defendants from foreclosing on the contract. 
It should be noted that the Appellees do not address any of 
the factual issues raised by the Appellants with regard to the 
issue of anticipatory breach (Appellees' brief at 23). 
In summary, the payment ledger, Addendum No. 2 to 
Appellants' original brief, demonstrates that after the credit 
line was opened on July 7, 1986 there were wide fluctuations in 
4 
the balance of the $50,000.00 line of credit. The Plaintiffs 
withdrew significant amounts and likewise made payments of over 
$32,000.00 (R. 140-142, Addendum No. 2 to Appellants1 original 
brief). 
The facts establish that the Plaintiffs continued to make 
payments on the loan up to June of 1991 (R. 140-142, Addendum No. 
2 to Appellants' original brief). 
On July 7, 1991, Mr. Chris Wold, the loan officer for the 
Defendants wrote a letter to the Plaintiffs requiring monthly 
payments for the months of June, July and August of 1991 and then 
payment in full of the credit line by August 27, 1991 (R. 139). 
The Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis testified that he had two 
conversations with Mr. Wold in person in which Mr. Wold "promised 
to reopen [the] credit line and allow [Davis] to use it upon 
payment of . . . $19,000.00 (Steven C. Davis deposition at 58-59, 
Addendum No. 5 to Appellants' original brief). Further, in 
Steven C. Davis's affidavit of January 9, 1993, Mr. Davis stated: 
2. On or about June 17, 1991, a management employee of 
Defendant, Chris Wold, indicated to myself and 
Defendant Clyde Davis that if a pay down on the 
credit line was made in the amount of nineteen thousand 
dollars ($19,000.00), that the credit line would 
remain open and available for use. 
3. Based upon the representation of Chris Wold, 
defendant Clyde Davis paid down the credit line on 
order that I could go back to school and would be able 
5 
to keep the account current by making payments on the 
credit line from the available balance. 
R. 19-20. 
The Defendant, H. Clyde Davis, testified in his deposition 
and affidavit that Chris Wold told him that if the Plaintiffs 
would pay the $20,000.00, the credit line would be reopened and 
would be available for use by the Plaintiffs (H. Clyde Davis 
deposition at 22-23, 26-29, Addendum No. 6 to Appellants' 
original brief). 
Amazingly, Chris Wold, in his affidavit filed by the 
Defendants acknowledged that if the $20,000.00 were paid and 
"interest only" payments were made and if the first mortgage 
remained current, the credit line could be paid off within a 
"reasonable period of time" and that "U.S. Bancorp would 'work 
with' the Davis . . . ." (R. at 80-81). 
The Record is clear that after the Plaintiffs made the 
$20,000.00 payment, the Defendants refused to allow the 
Plaintiffs to withdraw any monies from the credit line. 
The facts outlined above establish an anticipatory breach 
of contract in that Mr. Wold refused to extend the line of credit 
even though the Plaintiffs had paid the required $20,000.00. No 
one disputes that Wold's action in refusing to open the line of 
credit constitutes "a positive and unequivocal intent not to 
render performance." Hurwitz v. David K. Richards Co., 436 P.2d 
794, 796 (Utah 1968). 
The Plaintiffs' position is that they were entitled, upon 
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the anticipatory breach by the Defendants, to refuse to make any 
further payments on the credit line. Additionally, the 
anticipatory breach by the Defendants would preclude the 
Defendants from using the Plaintiffs' failure to pay as a basis 
to foreclose on the credit line. 
The Plaintiffs1 theory is that an agreement was reached 
with Mr. Wold, an agent of the Defendants, that if the Plaintiffs 
paid the required $20,000.00, the credit line would remain open, 
allowing the Plaintiffs to access the same for any use, including 
obtaining money to make temporary payments to the Defendants. 
The Plaintiffs contend that the facts outlined above 
demonstrate an anticipatory breach. Upon the anticipatory 
repudiation of the contract, the Plaintiffs could treat the same 
as a breach and be excused from any further performance or 
payment. Kasco Services Corp., v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 
1992); See Appellants' original brief at 14. Contrary to the 
assertion to the Defendants on appeal, a finding of anticipatory 
breach by the trial court would have precluded summary judgment 
and constituted a defense to the foreclosure action by the 
Defendants. Utah case law established that a party to a contract 
can not by willful act or omission make it impossible or 
difficult for another to perform and then invoke the others non-
performance as a breach. Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P. 2d 140 (Utah 
1982); Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Ferris v. 
Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979); Weber Meadow-View Corp. v. 
Wilde, 575 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1978). 
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POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF 
BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
A. Elements of Breach of Contract. 
The Appellees do not dispute the elements of a cause of 
action based upon breach of contract set out in the Appellants1 
original brief (Appellants' original brief at 23, Appellees' 
brief at 24). 
B. There are Disputed Issues of Material Fact Relating to 
the Plaintiffs' Claim of Breach of Contract. 
The Defendants do not contest the assertion of the 
Plaintiffs that the Record in this case clearly establishes a 
claim for breach of contract. Although the Ninth Cause of Action 
of Plaintiffs' compliant is captioned "Breach of Fiduciary Duty," 
the Appellees do not contest that the cause of action 
substantively identifies the elements of a cause of action for 
breach of contract. In fact, Appellees state: 
Appellants' arguments in support of their Ninth Cause 
of Action might otherwise be well and good, except that 
that action was dismissed by stipulation of the parties 
in open court. The order granting summary judgment 
dismisses the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh and 
Eighth Causes of Action, and then states: "Inasmuch as 
plaintiffs' other causes of action have already been 
dismissed by stipulation and order, plaintiffs' 
complaint is now fully dismissed with prejudice." 
Appellees' brief at 24. 
The Record in this case relating to the hearing on the 
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motion for summary judgment consists of a Minute Entry and the 
Order prepared by counsel for the Defendants. The Minute Entry 
dated the same day as the argument, January 3, 1994 fails to 
recite any stipulation relating to the voluntary dismissal of 
any of the causes of action contained in the Plaintiffs' 
complaint (R. 446-447). 
In the Order prepared by counsel for the Defendants there is 
one sentence, contained in the recitals of the Order that relates 
to the alleged stipulation. The recital language is not included 
in the substantive portion of the Order. The one sentence 
recites: 
Inasmuch as plaintiffs1 other causes of action have 
already been dismissed by stipulation and order, 
plaintiffs' Complaint is now fully dismissed with 
prejudice. 
R. 552, Addendum No. 1 hereto. 
A review of the entire Record in this case fails to produce 
any stipulation and order relating to the dismissal of the Ninth 
Cause of Action. Counsel for the Plaintiffs neither stipulated 
to the dismissal of the Cause of Action in open court nor signed 
any stipulation or order relating thereto. 
Rule 41(a)(1) is explicit: 
. . . an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff 
without order of court (i) by filing a notice of 
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse 
party of an answer or of a motion for summary 
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judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal 
signed by all parties who appeared in the action 
. . . . (Emphasis added). 
Rule 4-504(3) of the Code of Judicial Administration 
recites that: 
Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be 
reduced to writing and presented to the court for 
signature within 15 days of the settlement and 
dismissal. 
The facts of this case establish that no stipulation was 
prepared, signed or delivered to the court. The one phrase 
relating to a proposed stipulation is contained only in the 
recitals to the order granting summary judgment and was not part 
of the substantive order. Additionally, a Court Order would be 
ineffective inasmuch as the dismissal was based upon a non-
existent stipulation. The Appellees argue further that the 
Appellants failed to establish a material issue of fact relating 
to damages (Appellees' brief at 24). Defendants do not dispute 
the extensive factual outline of the disputed issues of fact 
relating to the Plaintiffs1 claim of breach of contract 
(Appellants' brief at 23-27). 
There is simply no question that the Plaintiffs have 
established a prima facie case of breach of contract. Taking the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the 
Defendant was obligated to allow the Plaintiffs access to the 
credit line after the $20,000.00 was paid. The failure to allow 
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that access caused the Plaintiffs failure to make the required 
monthly payments and inability to prevent the foreclosure. As a 
result, the Defendant was allowed to foreclose on the Plaintiffs1 
home and property and the Plaintiffs were denied their rights 
under the credit line agreement. 
Equally clear is the prima facie case of the Defendant's 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith dealing. Mr. Wold 
failed to create a document memorializing the conditions attached 
to the $20,000.00 payment. That failure is especially crucial in 
that Mr. Wold's own affidavit recognized that he had agreed to 
forego foreclosure and allow the Plaintiffs a "reasonable time" 
in which to pay off the loan. Under those conditions, a lending 
institution clearly has a duty to document the transaction to 
prevent any misunderstanding. Additionally, the failure of Mr. 
Wold to send a letter to the Plaintiffs outlining his position 
before commencing foreclosure and setting the matter for sale 
constitutes egregious conduct. Granting the Defendant the right 
to commence foreclosure certainly constituted significant damage 
for which the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover. 
The Plaintiffs right to recover special damages is discussed 
hereinafter. For purposes of the breach of contract cause of 
action, the wrongful commencement of foreclosure proceedings and 
denial of the right to access the remaining credit line 
constitute sufficient damage to avoid the entry of summary 
judgment. 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION 
11 
BASED ON ESTOPPEL, 
A. Elements of Estoppel. 
The Appellees do not dispute the elements of equitable 
estoppel (Appellees' brief at 21). The elements essential to 
invoke equitable estoppel are (1) a statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act by one party that is inconsistent with a claim 
later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other 
party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act; and, (3) injury to the second 
party that would result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act. Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 
671 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, 
Inc. , 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989); Celebrity Club, Inc. v. 
Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979); Utah 
Dep't of Transp. v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 751 P.2d 
270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
B. The Plaintiffs Established a Prima Facie Case of 
Estoppel. 
The Appellees do not dispute that the basis the trial judge 
used in granting summary judgment on the estoppel issue is as 
follows: 
. . . Although the plaintiffs presented evidence 
about their understanding of what would happen after 
making a $19,000.00 payment to U.S. Bancorp, there 
was no evidence presented as to any actual statement 
made by an employee of U.S. Bancorp that mislead the 
12 
plaintiffs and/or Clyde Davis. Based on the lack of 
competent evidence to prove any erroneous statement, 
the Court need not address the issue of damages. 
R. 551. 
The Defendants apparently do not dispute that the Plaintiffs 
have created a factual issue with regard to equitable estoppel. 
The Defendants do not dispute that Chris Wold, as an agent of the 
Defendants, represented that the Plaintiffs would have no problem 
withdrawing further funds from the credit line in order to go to 
school if the $20,000.00 payment was made (R. 48, R. 19-20, 79-
84; Steven C. Davis deposition at 58-59, Addendum No. 5 to 
Appellants' original brief). Obviously the facts establish that 
the Plaintiffs relied upon the statement made by Wold by making 
the $20,000.00 payment. As a result, the Plaintiffs were forced 
to take out other loans (R. 45), suffered through post-traumatic 
stress syndrome (Response to Interrogatory No. 7), suffered 
through damaged relations with neighbors, suffered disruption of 
family life and incurred other losses (Response to Interrogatory 
No. 7). 
The Defendants argue that estoppel must be proved by clear 
and convincing evidence and that the burden of proof has some 
bearing on these proceedings (Appellees1 brief at 21). However, 
Utah law is clear that: 
.as to questions concerning material issues of 
fact, "affidavits and depositions submitted in support 
of and in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
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may be used only to determine whither a material issue 
of fact exists, not to determine whether one party's 
case is less persuasive than another's or is not likely 
to succeed in a trial on the merits." 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983); See also Ron 
Shepherd Insurance v. Shields, supra. As clearly indicated by 
the case law, the issue on appeal is whether a material issue of 
fact exists and not whether or not the burden of persuasion has 
been met. 
Secondly, Appellees argue that the Plaintiffs' claims 
relating to estoppel are barred by the Statute of Frauds 
(Appellees' brief at 22). 
The claim of the Appellees fails in two regards. First, the 
Plaintiffs have a cause of action based upon the clear language 
of the original U.S. Creditline Revolving Creditline and 
Disclosure (R. 75-78, Addendum No. 1 to Appellants' original 
brief). Under the terms of the agreement the Defendants had an 
obligation "so long as [the] account is not cancelled, you are 
not in default, or there has not been any material adverse change 
in your financial condition, [to] lend you money according to 
this account . . » . (R. 75-78). As indicated in the Statement 
of Facts of Appellants' original brief, timely payments were made 
by the Plaintiffs up to the time that Mr. Wold wrote his letter 
to the Plaintiffs dated July 7, 1991 demanding that the note be 
paid off in its entirety by August 27, 1991 (R. 139). 
Secondly, the Plaintiffs are not relying exclusively upon 
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oral modifications to the original agreement. Mr. Wold's letter 
of July 7, 1991 deviates from the stated conditions of the credit 
line agreement. Further, Mr. Wold, in his affidavit acknowledges 
that the $20,000.00 payment entitled the Plaintiffs to a 
reasonable period of time to resolve the matter (R. at 80-81). 
In summary, the Plaintiffs are not trying to establish an 
independent agreement with the Defendants. Rather, the issue 
relates to a determination of the Plaintiffs1 rights under the 
terms of the credit line agreement once the $20,000.00 payment 
was made. That issue must be resolved by looking to the 
agreement and the conversation and dealings between the parties. 
Utah Code Annotated 25-5-4(6) (1989 as Amended), prohibits 
enforcement of credit agreements that are not founded in writing. 
However, the use of parol evidence to establish a course of 
dealing between parties on a credit line agreement is not 
prohibited by the explicit language of the Statute of Frauds. 
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION BASED 
UPON MISREPRESENTATION. 
A. Elements of the Misrepresentation Cause of Action. 
The Appellees do not contest the elements of a cause of 
action for Misrepresentation as outlined in the Appellants' 
original brief (Appellees' brief at 20). The Elements of 
Misrepresentation are: 
(1) That a representation was made; 
(2) concerning a presently existing material 
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the 
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representor either (a) knew to be false or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) 
that the other party, acting reasonably and 
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact 
rely upon it; (a) and was thereby induced to 
act (9) to his injury and damage. 
Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); 
Schuhman v. Green River Motel, 835 P.2d 992, 994 (Utah 1992); 
Wright v. Westside Nurseiy, 787 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah App. 1990); 
Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, 274-275 (Utah 1952). 
B. The Plaintiffs have Established a Prima Facie Case of 
Misrepresentation Which Should have Precluded the Entry 
of Summary Judgment. 
The Plaintiffs, in their Statement of Facts clearly outline 
material issues of fact relating to the Misrepresentation Cause 
of Action. The Appellees cite favorable portions from the 
depositions of Steve Davis and Clyde Davis and then state that 
"misrepresentation must be proved by clear and convincing 
evidence" (Appellees' brief at 18-29). 
However, as indicated repeatedly herein, the issue on this 
appeal relates to the existence of material issues of fact and 
not a weighing process involving the determination of which party 
is more persuasive. Webster v. Sill, supra; Ron Shepherd 
Insurance v. Shields, supra. 
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There is ample evidence that the Defendant's agent, Chris 
Wold made an explicit representation to the Plaintiffs regarding 
the credit line agreement. In summary, Chris Wold represented 
that U.S. Bancorp would not take any further action with regard 
to the alleged negative amortization of the first mortgage as 
long as the Plaintiffs paid a $19,000.00 payment and two payments 
of $500.00 to be applied to regular monthly payments. In 
addition, Mr. Wold represented that the available credit, up to 
$50,000.00 would be available to the Plaintiffs to finance 
schooling and meet their other monthly expenses including the 
monthly obligations owing to U.S. Bancorp. That representation 
made by Mr. Wold concerned a presently existing material of fact. 
The representations of Mr. Wold were no doubt false in that 
the Defendants instituted a foreclosure action. The fact finder 
could easily determine that Mr. Wold made the representation to 
the Plaintiffs in order to induce the Plaintiffs in to making the 
$20,000.00 payment and reducing the credit line. Even Mr. Wold 
concedes that a deal was made: 
14. Affiant [Wold] told H. Clyde Davis that if 
payment of $20,000.00 was received for the month of 
June, (A) additional monthly payments to U.S. Bancorp 
of at least "interest only" would have to be made 
monthly to U.S. Bancorp, (B) monthly payments to 
HUD would have to be kept current, and (C) the 
credit line would still have to be paid off. 
R. 81. 
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The fact finder would have to determine the meaning of the 
words used in Mr. Wold's deposition and particularly the meaning 
of "paid-off within a reasonable period of time and that U.S. 
Bancorp would "work with" the Davis while the credit line was 
being paid off (R. 80). The facts established by the Plaintiffs' 
testimony and that of H. Clyde Davis was that the payment was 
made to solve any complaints of U.S. Bancorp and based upon the 
representation that the credit line, up to $50,000.00 would 
continue to be available. 
A fact finder could easily determine that the Plaintiffs and 
the Defendant H. Clyde Davis acted reasonably in paying the money 
and were ignorant of any falsity attached to Mr. Wold's 
representations. 
As a result of the Plaintiffs reliance, they were damaged. 
They lost the source of funds from which to make the monthly 
payments to the Defendant and to prevent foreclosure. In 
addition, the Plaintiffs loan with the Defendant became 
delinquent and allowed the Defendant the basis upon which to 
foreclose. 
The Appellees again contend that the Appellants could not 
prove damages arising out of the claimed misrepresentation 
(Appellees' brief at 20). As demonstrated throughout the 
pleadings and briefs, the largest item of damage suffered by the 
Plaintiffs was the foreclosure of their home and property given 
as security for the credit line and the inability to discharge 
the loan by regular monthly payments. That element alone is 
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sufficient to survive summary judgment. 
Counsel for the Plaintiffs recognized that prior counsel for 
Plaintiffs may have been dilatory in establishing the ancillary 
damages alleged in the complaint consisting of post-traumatic 
stress syndrome, lost wages and other required items. However, 
the Defendants have maintained throughout that the conduct of the 
Plaintiffs precludes the foreclosure of the property (R. 449-457, 
R. 14-28; 57-67). 
POINT VI: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
SLANDER OF TITLE 
A. The Elements for Slander of Title. 
The Appellees do not dispute the four elements constituting 
Slander of Title. First, there must be a publication, either 
oral or written, of a slanderous statement. A slanderous 
statement is one that is derogatory or injurious to the legal 
validity of an owner's title or to his or her right to sell or 
hypothecate the property; Second, the statement must be false; 
Third, the statement must have been made with malice; and, Fourth 
the statement must cause actual or special damages to the 
Plaintiff. 
Bass v. Planned Management Services, Inc., 761 P.2d 566 (Utah 
1988); Jack B. Parsons Cos. v. Nield, 751 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Utah 
1988); Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 208 P.2d 956, 958 (Utah 1949). 
B. The Plaintiffs Established a Prima Facie Case for 
Slander of Title. 
As it relates to the first element, Appellees still deny 
that the foreclosure was published. Utah Code Annotated 57-1-25 
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(1989 as Amended) provides that the notice of sale must be 
published three times in a newspaper of general circulation and 
by posting notice of the same on the property and also in at 
least three public places. The Defendants do not seriously argue 
that the foreclosure was not completed and in fact notice of 
various sales was published numerous times. It was the setting 
of the sale, pursuant to the trust deed that prompted the motions 
for preliminary injunction (R. 15-28). 
Appellees then argue that the filing of a wrongful 
foreclosure is privileged, to the same extent as a lis pendens 
(Appellees1 brief at 26). The commencement of a wrongful 
foreclosure and the posting of a notice of sale is not protected. 
Bass v. Planned Management Services, Inc., 761 P.2d 566 (Utah 
1988); Jack B. Parson Co., v. Nield, supra. 
It is important to note that the Plaintiffs do not contend 
that the notice of default alone constituted a slander of title. 
Rather, the notice of the trustee's sale based upon wrongful 
foreclosure constitutes the slander of title. 
Finally, Appellees claim that the Plaintiffs have failed to 
establish damages. The Plaintiffs were required to initiate this 
action to both stop the foreclosure and remove the lien created 
by the foreclosure from the property (R. 1-28, 37-50, 57-64). 
The Complaint and Amended Complaint both request an award of 
attorney fees. Inasmuch as attorney fees were expended to remove 
the cloud from the Plaintiffs' and the Defendant H. Clyde Davis' 
title, the attorney fees constitute the special damages required 
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to make a prima facie case for slander of title. Bass,, supra. 
POINT VII: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
DEFAMATION. 
The Appellees do not address the substance of the 
Plaintiffs' cause of action for Defamation (Appellees' brief at 
26-29). Although included in the title of the Point, there is 
no refutation to the argument made in the Appellants' original 
brief. 
The Plaintiffs contend that the court granted the motion for 
summary judgment on the basis that "the court has not been given 
any evidence of publication of alleged defamatory comments." (R. 
549-550). Appellees contended at trial that the Plaintiffs 
failed to establish any damage. 
Unlike slander of title, the tort of liable and slander are 
personal torts. Personal torts may be based on tangible and 
intangible losses and give rise to presumed general and special 
damages. Bass v. Planned Management Services, supra. 
Accordingly damages are not relevant and were not used as a basis 
in deciding summary judgment as it relates to the Defamation 
cause of action. 
There is no question in the case law that the imputation of 
indebtedness or delinquency in paying ones debts is libellous. 
Reed v. Melnick, 471 P.2d 178 (N.M. 1970); Hinkle v. Alexander, 
411 P.2d 829 (Or. 1966); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 
(Ala. 1983). Certainly in this case, the commencement of a 
foreclosure action without any right is libelous in that it 
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inasmuch as its fair meaning is that the Plaintiffs are 
delinquent and are unable to pay their debts. 
As it relates to the claim that there was no publication, 
the pleadings establish the requisite issues of fact. As 
established by the pleadings and Utah Code Annotated 57-1-31 
(1985 as Amended), the Notice of Sale must be published at least 
three times, once a week for three consecutive weeks in a 
newspaper having a general circulation in the county in which the 
property is to be located. Additionally, the Notice of Sale must 
be posted on the property to be sold and also in at least three 
public places of the city or county where the property is 
located. Utah Code Annotated 57-1-25 (1989 as Amended). In 
light of the clear public filings and posting, there is clear 
evidence in the record that the libelous statements were in fact 
published and the court committed error in granting summary 
judgment. 
POINT VIII: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE NEGLIGENT INFLICTION 
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Appellees sole rebuttal to the Plaintiffs1 contention that 
the court erroneously granted summary judgment on the issue of 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress is: 
Even if U.S. Bancorp and its employees knew of the 
Appellants' mental frailties, there was no 
evidence that the action to foreclose the real 
property was anything but lawful. 
Appellees' brief at 25. 
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As established time and time again, there is considerable 
question as to whether the foreclosure was lawfully commenced. 
The Plaintiffs have established that Chris Wold, an authorized 
agent of the Defendants, explicitly agreed with the Plaintiffs 
that upon the payment of $20,000.00, no foreclosure would take 
place and the Plaintiffs would have full rights to access the 
credit line. 
Additionally, the issue of whether or not the conduct of 
U.S. Bancorp in commencing the foreclosure under the facts of 
this case constitutes "extreme and outrageous conduct," is a 
question of fact to be resolved by the fact finder. As stated by 
the Court in Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of ME., Inc., 534 A.2d 
1282 (ME. 1987), the issue of the type of conduct that is 
compensable, is best left to the jury. 
Certainly, the facts of this case are not those typically 
seen in a foreclosure action. The agent and employees of the 
Defendant lured the Plaintiffs into paying $20,000.00 and then 
wrongfully commenced foreclosure. The Record establishes that 
the agents and employees of the Defendant knew that the 
Plaintiffs were suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome. 
Further, the agents of the Defendant knew that they had promised 
the Plaintiffs continued access to the credit line in order to 
meet their regular monthly expenses and specifically the monthly 
payments owing to the Defendant. It is respectfully submitted 
that any reasonable person would know that the total repudiation 
of the agreement and the initiation of foreclosure activities 
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with the posting of notices would cause persons suffering from 
Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome to suffer additional emotional and 
physical harm. 
POINT IX: THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN DENYING AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES, 
The court ruled that it would not allow the Defendants to 
re-coup attorney fees incurred in defending against the torts 
alleged by the Plaintiffs. The court did allow the award of 
attorney fees associated directly with the foreclosure action (R. 
566-567, 568-571). 
Plaintiffs have failed to find any case which allows the 
recovery of fees associated with defending against alleged 
tortious misconduct. The cases cited by the Defendants do not 
stand for that proposition but relate only to attorney fees 
incurred in associated contract questions. Brown v. Richards, 
840 P.2d 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 
856 (Utah 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the ruling of the trial court 
granting summary judgment in this case and deny the Defendants' 
claim for attorney fees. 
DATED this _5 day of May, 1995. 
A^K^~xr 
Robert L. Moody, Esq. 71 
Attorney for Appellants, Davis 
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